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Abstract
We study financial networks with debt contracts and credit default swaps between specific
pairs of banks. Given such a financial system, we want to decide which of the banks are in
default, and how much of their liabilities these defaulting banks can pay. There can easily be
multiple different solutions to this problem, leading to a situation of default ambiguity and a
range of possible solutions to implement for a financial authority.
In this paper, we study the general properties of the solution space of such financial systems,
and analyze a wide range of reasonable objective functions for selecting from the set of solu-
tions. Examples of such objective functions include minimizing the number of defaulting banks,
minimizing the amount of unpaid debt, maximizing the number of satisfied banks, maximizing
the equity of a specific bank, finding the most balanced distribution of equity, and many others.
We show that for all of these objective functions, it is not only NP-hard to find the optimal
solution, but it is also NP-hard to approximate this optimum: for each objective function, we
show an inapproximability either to an n1/2−ǫ or to an n1/4−ǫ factor for any ǫ > 0, with n
denoting the number of banks in the system. Thus even if an authority has clear criteria to
select a solution in case of default ambiguity, it is computationally intractable to find a solution
that is reasonably good in terms of this criteria. We also show that our hardness results hold
in a wide range of different model variants.
1 Introduction
Financial systems are often called “highly complex”, suggesting that relations and contracts between
different financial institutions such as banks form a networked system that is basically impossible to
understand. However, computer science has developed a comprehensive methodology to quantify
the complexity of such problems. This classification has a range of problems that are known to be
hard to solve, and it also has problems that are even worse in the sense that they are even hard to
reasonably approximate.
At the core of understanding financial systems is the so-called clearing problem: given a system
of banks with (conditional or unconditional) debt contracts between specific banks, we need to
decide which of the banks are in default due to these debts, and how much of their liabilities can
these defaulting banks pay. This is a fundamental problem in a financial system, and an essential
task for a financial regulator after a shock, with the 2008 financial crisis as a recent example. Our
main goal in this paper is to understand the computational complexity of the clearing problem.
Earlier results have shown that clearing a financial system is computationally straightforward if
all the contracts between the banks are unconditional debts. More generally, clearing is solvable
if the contracts in the network represent so-called “long” positions, i.e., a better outcome for one
bank ensures a better (or the same) outcome for every other bank.
However, this is not always the case in real-world financial systems: in practice, banks often
have “short” positions on each other, i.e. it can be more favorable for a bank if another bank is in
a worse situation. Typical short positions are credit default swaps (CDSs), short-selling options,
and other types of derivatives.
This suggests that a realistic analysis of financial systems requires a model that can capture both
long and short positions. However, with both short and long positions in the network, financial
systems suddenly exhibit significantly richer behavior. In particular, we can easily have situations
of default ambiguity when there are multiple (possibly a high number of) solutions in the system,
and none of these solutions is obviously superior to the others in terms of clearing.
In practice, a clearing authority has to make a choice among these different possible solutions
of the system, yielding an outcome that is more favorable to some banks and less favorable to
others. In this paper, we focus on such cases of default ambiguity, and analyze a range of different
criteria for the clearing authority to evaluate the available solutions and select one of them to
implement. Our main result is negative, showing that even if the solution set of a system can be
easily characterized, and the financial regulator has a clear objective function to select among these
solutions, it is still computationally hard to find the best solution of the financial system, or even
to approximate it to any reasonable (e.g. constant or polylogarithmic) factor.
Our contributions begin with some observations about the solution space of financial systems,
regarding the possible number of solutions and their Pareto-optimality. We then discuss a wide
range of problems, each of which is about finding the best solution in a financial system according
to a specific objective function. These problems include finding the solution
• with the smallest number of defaulting banks,
• with the smallest amount of total unpaid debt,
• which is preferred by the largest number of banks,
• which is the most favorable one for a specific bank,
• which has the most balanced distribution of equity for specific banks,
and many others. Our main contribution is showing that all these problems are not only NP-hard
to solve, but also NP-hard to approximate to any n1/2−ǫ factor for some of these problems, and
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to any n1/4−ǫ factor for others (for any ǫ > 0). This shows that even if the clearing authority
has a well-defined objective function, finding a reasonably good solution is still computationally
intractable.
Finally, Section 6 shows that our hardness results also hold in slightly different variants of the
model, e.g. with default costs, bounded edge weights or heavily restricted short positions.
2 Related Work
One of the most fundamental financial system models is the one introduced by Eisenberg and
Noe [7], which only assumes simple debt contracts between banks. Following works have also
extended this model by default costs [18], cross-ownership relations [8, 21] or so-called covered
CDSs [16]. However, these model variants can only describe long positions in a network. This
means that there is always a solution that is simultaneously the best for every bank, and thus the
clearing problem is not particularly interesting in this setting.
In contrast to this, the recent work of Schuldenzucker, Seuken and Battiston [19,20] introduced
a model which also allows CDSs in the network, i.e. debt contracts where the payment obligation
depends on the default of a specific other bank. While a CDS is still a very simple financial contract,
it already allows us to capture short positions in the network. Moreover, CDSs are a prominent
kind of derivative in real-world financial systems that also played a major role in the 2008 financial
crisis [10].
We use this recent model of Schuldenzucker et. al. as the base model for our findings. With
both debt contracts and CDSs in the network, the clearing problem suddenly becomes significantly
more challenging. The work of [19,20] mostly focuses on the existence of a solution in this model,
and the computational complexity of finding an arbitrary solution; we summarize these results
in Section 4. The authors also discuss a set of strong restrictions to the system that ensure the
existence of a maximal solution, i.e. one that is simultaneously the best for all banks in the system.
However, in the general case, such a maximal solution does not exist, and thus the clearing
authority has to select from a set of solutions that represents a trade-off between the interests of
different banks. The work of [19, 20] does not analyze this situation, describing it as unwanted
since it is prone to the lobbying activity of banks in the system, trying to influence the authority
to select a solution that is beneficial to them. Our work aims to analyze the clearing problem in
this general case; to our knowledge, the problem has not been studied from this perspective before.
In general, the propagation of shocks in a network has been studied in many slightly different
variants of these models [1,3,9]. Other works introduced more substantial changes to these models,
e.g. time-dependent clearing mechanisms [2] or game-theoretic aspects [4].
There are also various approaches to develop some measure of the complexity or sensitivity of
a financial networks, often through classical graph-theoretic concepts [3, 11]. To our knowledge,
besides [19,20], the only result that specifically discusses computational complexity in this context
is the work of [15] in the model of [8], showing that among the shocks of a given total size, it is
computationally hard to find the one that is most damaging to the system altogether.
There is also a wide literature on different kinds of financial derivatives; CDSs in particular have
been studied extensively in [6,10,17]. On the more practical side, the clearing problem also plays a
central role when executing stress tests to evaluate the sensitivity of financial systems, e.g. in the
European Central Bank’s stress test framework [5].
2
3 Model definition
3.1 Banks and contracts
A financial system consists of a set of banks B. Individual banks are usually denoted by u, v or w,
the number of banks by n = |B|. Each bank v has a certain amount of external assets available to
the bank, denoted by ev.
We assume that there are contracts for payments between given pairs of banks in the system.
Each such contract is between two specific banks u and v, and obliges u (the debtor) to pay a specific
amount of money (known as the notional) to the other bank v (the creditor), either unconditionally
or based on a specific condition (to be discussed later). We assume that any initial payments that
resulted in these contracts (e.g. bank v lending a given amount of money to u in the past which
results in a debt from u to v in the present) are already implicitly represented in the external
assets of the banks. Hence the external assets and the contracts together contain all the necessary
information to analyze the current state of the system.
The contracts altogether result in a specific amount of payment obligations for each bank v. If
v cannot fulfill these obligations, then we say that v is in default. In this case, the recovery rate of
v, denoted by rv, is the portion of liabilities that v is able to pay. This shows that we always have
rv ∈ [0, 1], and v is in default exactly if rv < 1. For the special case when v is not able to pay at
all, i.e. rv = 0, we say that v is in complete default.
The model allows two kinds of contracts between banks. Debt contracts (or simply debts) oblige
bank u to pay a specific amount to bank v unconditionally, i.e. in any case. On the other hand, we
also allows credit default swaps (CDSs) between u and v in reference to a third bank w. A CDS
represents a conditional debt that obliges u to pay a specific amount to v only in case if bank w is
in default. More specifically, if the notional of the CDS is δ and the recovery rate of bank w is rw,
then the CDS incurs a payment obligation of δ · (1− rw) from node u to v.
In practice, banks can have many possible motivations to enter into CDSs with each other.
CDSs can be used as an insurance policy in case of the default of one of the debtors of the bank to
mitigate risks, or they can be placed due to speculations based on insights regarding the market.
While real-world financial systems also have various other kinds of contracts between banks,
debts and CDSs already allow us to model the two basic kinds of relations in a financial network.
A debt contract from u to v can express a long position of v on u: if u has a larger recovery rate,
then it is able to pay a larger portion of its debt to v. On the other hand, v being the creditor of
a CDS in reference to w can express a short position of v on w: if w has a smaller recovery rate,
then v receives more payment from this CDS.
Before a formal definition, consider a simple example financial system in Figure 1. In this
system, bank u has a total liability of 4 due to the 2 outgoing debts, but it only has 2 external
assets; hence it is in default, an its recovery rate is ru =
1
2 . The model assumes that in this case, it
makes payments proportionally to the respective liabilities in the contracts; thus it transfers 1 unit
of money to w and 1 unit to v.
Since u has a recovery rate of ru =
1
2 , the CDS from w to v translates to a liability of 2·(1−ru) = 1
unit of money. Although w has no external assets, it receives 1 unit of money from u as discussed
before, so it can fulfill this payment obligation and narrowly avoids default, hence rw = 1.
Finally, v has no liabilities at all, so rv = 1. Since it receives 1 unit of money from both u and
w, and has ev = 1, v has 3 units of money after the clearing of the system.
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Figure 1: Example financial system, with a consistent notation to that of [19]. External assets are
shown in rectangles besides the banks. Simple debts are shown as blue arrows, while CDSs are
shown as orange arrows with a dotted line to the reference bank.
3.2 Assets and liabilities
The systems described above can be compactly represented in a few matrices and vectors. The
external assets of banks can be represented as a vector e = (ev)v∈B , the notionals of debts between
banks as a matrix D = (δu,v)u,v∈B , with δu,v denoting the notional of debt from u to v (interpreted
as δu,v = 0 if there is no such debt). Finally, the CDSs in the system form a 3-dimensional matrix
C = (δwu,v)u,v,w∈B, with δwu,v denoting the notional of the CDS from u to v with reference to w. In
line with previous work, we always assume that no bank enters into either a contract with itself
or in reference to itself. Thus given a financial system on B by (e,D,C), we are interested in the
recovery rates rv of banks in the system, which can also be represented as a vector r = (rv)v∈B .
Given a recovery rate vector r, the liability of u to v is formally defined as
lu,v(r) = δu,v +
∑
w∈B
δwu,v · (1− rw).
The total liability of bank u is then lu(r) =
∑
v∈B lu,v(r), i.e. the sum of payment obligations
for u. However, the actual payment from u to v can be lower than lu,v(r) if u is in default. The
model assumes that defaulting banks always use all their assets to pay for liabilities, and they make
payments proportionally to the respective liabilities. Hence with a recovery rate of ru, u is able to
pay an ru portion of each liability, so the payment from u to v is pu,v(r) = ru · lu,v(r).
On the other hand, the assets of v are defined as
av(r) = ev +
∑
u∈B
pu,v(r).
Given the assets and liabilities of bank v, the recovery rate rv has to satisfy rv = 1 if av(r) ≥ lv(r)
(i.e. if v is not in default), and rv =
av(r)
lv(r)
if av(r) < lv(r) (if v is in default). If a vector r is an
equilibrium point of these equations, i.e. it satisfies this condition on av(r) and lv(r) for every bank
v, then r is a clearing vector of the system. Our main goal in the paper is to analyze the different
clearing vectors.
We also define the equity of node v in a solution as
qv(r) = max(av(r)− lv(r), 0),
i.e. the amount of funds available to v after clearing. We assume that the main goal of banks is to
maximize their equity. In the example system of Figure 1, the equities of banks in the only solution
of the system are qu = 0, qw = 0 and qv = 3.
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Note that we have written qu instead of qu(r) in order to simplify notation; we often do not
show the dependence on r when r is clear from the context. However, recall that assets, liabilities
and equities are always in fact a function of r.
In the rest of the paper, we use mathematical terminology to discuss the systems. We refer to
the banks in the system as nodes, and the clearing vectors as solutions, with the set of solutions
denoted by S. The notionals of debts and CDSs are called the weight of the contracts.
3.3 Systems with loss
Besides the described model of financial systems, the work of [19, 20] also studies a more general
variant which also assumes default costs, based on an earlier model introduced by [18]. In this
generalized variant, systems have two further global parameters α, β ∈ [0, 1]. The model assumes
that when a bank is in default, it loses a specific fraction of its assets; more specifically, it only has
access to an α portion of its external assets and a β portion of its incoming payments. Thus if v is
in default, its assets are defined as
av(r) = α · ev + β ·
∑
u∈B
pu,v(r).
This sudden drop in assets results in financial systems with significantly different properties [19,20].
Our original model is obtained for α = β = 1. We also refer to these original systems as systems
without loss, while systems with α < 1 or β < 1 are called systems with loss.
The introduction of default costs into the systems does not affect the main ideas of our construc-
tions. For ease of presentation, we focus on financial systems without loss throughout the paper,
i.e. we assume α = β = 1 unless specified otherwise. Section 6.1 discusses the minor modifications
required to adapt our proofs to the case of systems with loss.
3.4 Terminology from graph theory
We prove our hardness results by reductions from graph theoretic problems. In these underlying
problems, we study simple, unweighted, undirected graphs G, with their node set and edge set
denoted by V and E, respectively. We use N = |V | to denote the number of nodes in such graphs.
We use z to denote the nodes of G (somewhat irregularly), in order to avoid confusion with the
nodes of the financial system. For a given node z, let NG(z) denote the set of neighbors of z.
Given a graph G on a set of nodes V , we say that a set of nodes V0 ⊆ V is independent if there
is no (z1, z2) ∈ E such that z1 ∈ V0, z2 ∈ V0. We say that a node set V0 ⊆ V is dominating if for
every z ∈ V , at least one node of z ∪NG(z) is contained in V0.
We use two well-known graph-theoretic problems as the basis of our reduction. Given a graph
G, the goal of the maximum independent set problem (MaxIS) is to find an independent set of
maximum size in the graph, i.e. an independent set V0 such that |V0| is as high as possible. The
goal of the minimum independent dominating set problem (MinIDS) is to find a set V0 which
is both independent and dominating, with |V0| as small as possible. We note that any maximal
independent set in G is both an independent set and an independent dominating set, so both of
these problems have a valid solution in any nonempty graph G. It is known that both MaxIS and
MinIDS are not only NP-hard to solve, but also NP-hard to approximate to a factor of N1−ǫ for
any ǫ > 0 [13,14].
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4 Properties of the solution space
The previous work of Schuldenzucker et. al. mostly focuses on the existence and computability of
solutions in financial systems [19,20]. Their main results can be summarized as follows:
• Loss-free systems: in this case, there always exists a solution. However, the proof of this
is non-constructive; finding an (approximate) solution is still computationally hard.
• Systems with loss: in this case, a solution might not exists at all. Deciding if a system has
an (approximate) solution is an NP-hard problem.
Once we know that a solution exists, another natural question is if there is a solution that is
clearly better than all others, i.e. it is the primary preference of every node. More formally, we
say that a solution r is maximal if qv(r) ≥ qv(r′) for every node v and every solution r′. If such
a maximal solution exists, then even though there may be other solutions, we can assume that a
clearing authority always prefers to implement this maximal solution.
However, Schuldenzucker et. al. also show that in both settings, a system can have multiple
solutions with none of them being maximal in the general case. This implies that the solutions
describe a trade-off between the interests of different nodes. Our paper analyzes a wide range of
objective functions that a reasonable authority could apply in this case.
4.1 A basic building block: the branching gadget
We begin with our most basic tool, the branching gadget. This gadget has already been widely used
(with some parametrizations) in the works of [19] and [20], e.g. as a simple example of a system
with no maximal solution. As shown in Figure 2, the gadget consists of two nodes x and y, both
having an outgoing debt to a sink node t and an incoming CDS from a source s. For the weight of
the two CDSs, denoted by δx and δy, we always assume δx ≥ δy ≥ 1.
Note that the source and sink nodes can never go into default, so for simplicity, we only analyze
the recovery rate subvector (rx, ry). First, observe that we cannot have both nodes surviving, i.e.
(1, 1) as a solution: both nodes only receive any funds if the other node is in default. However, if
one of the nodes is in complete default, then the other can already pay its debt, thus (0, 1) and
(1, 0) are always solutions in this system.
Besides (0, 1) and (1, 0), there may be other solutions when both nodes are in default with a
positive recovery rate; these depend on the concrete values of δx and δy. If x and y are in default,
then their assets are equal to the amount of outgoing debt that they are able to pay. Hence, the
remaining solutions of the system can be obtained from the equations
rx = δx · (1− ry)
ry = δy · (1− rx).
However, there are also choices of δx, δy for which the equations confirm that (0, 1) and (1, 0)
are indeed the only two solutions. One such example is when δx = 2, δy = 1; we refer to this special
case as the clean branching gadget. This gadget has the useful property of representing a binary
choice: rx can only take a value of 0 or 1, and ry offers a convenient representation of its negation.
The gadget was already used in [20], and it is also a crucial tool in our reductions. For convenience,
we say that the gadget is active in a solution if it is in state (1, 0), and not active otherwise.
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Figure 2: Branching gadget
4.2 Number of solutions
Using the branching gadget, we can now discuss some straightforward properties of the solution
space of financial systems. We first show that a number of solutions might be very large.
Observation 1. There exists a financial system with infinitely many solutions.
Proof. Consider the branching gadget of Figure 2 with δx = δy = 1. For any ρ ∈ [0, 1], the vector
(ρ, 1−ρ) satisfies the equations above, thus it is a solution of the system.
While this shows that the number of solutions is potentially unlimited, the difference between
these vectors is not significant: both x and y are in default for every ρ ∈ (0, 1), and the solutions
only differ in the extent of their default. It is natural to ask if we can also have a large number of
solutions that differ in the subset of nodes that are actually in default. We say that two solutions r
and r′ are essentially different if there exists a node v such that either rv = 1 but r′v < 1, or r′v = 1
but rv < 1. Since we only consider a boolean value for each node in this definition, the number of
pairwise essentially different solutions is at most 2n in any system.
Observation 2. There exists a system with 2Ω(n) solutions that are pairwise essentially different.
Proof. Let us create a system with n4 copies of the clean branching gadget, which are all independent
from each other. In each such gadget, there are two possible subsolutions: (0,1) or (1,0). Over the
distinct gadgets, these can be combined in any different way, which adds up to 2n/4 solutions that
are all pairwise essentially different.
4.3 Strictly better and worse solutions
While financial system may not always contain a maximal solution, it is still reasonable to say that
some specific solutions are definitely better than others.
Definition 3. Given two solutions r and r′, we say that r′ is strictly better than r (or r is strictly
worse than r′) if qv(r′) ≥ qv(r) for every node v, and there exists a node u such that qu(r′) > qu(r).
A solution r is Pareto-optimal if there is no solution r′ that is strictly better than r (otherwise, r
is Pareto-suboptimal).
A clearing authority may want to avoid implementing Pareto-suboptimal solutions, and prefer
a strictly better solution instead. However, selecting among Pareto-optimal solutions is a more
difficult question, since it represents a trade-off between the preferences of different nodes. Note
that a solution is maximal if and only if it is the only Pareto-optimal solution of the system.
Lemma 4. In a loss-free financial system, every solution is Pareto-optimal.
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Proof. We show that in every solution,
∑
v∈B qv =
∑
v∈B ev. Since
∑
v∈B ev is a fixed parameter
of the input problem, this already proves the statement.
Recall that in a given solution, pv =
∑
u∈B pv,u and av = ev +
∑
u∈B pu,v denotes the payments
and assets of node v, respectively. Furthermore, the equity of v is always qv = av − pv, regardless
of v being in default or not. This implies
∑
v∈B
qv =
∑
v∈B
(av − pv) =
∑
v∈B
(
ev +
∑
u∈B
pu,v −
∑
u∈B
pv,u
)
=
∑
v∈B
ev +
∑
u,v∈B
(pu,v − pu,v) =
∑
v∈B
ev.
However, when we have default costs in the system, then some funds are lost when a node goes
into default, and thus this property does not hold anymore.
Lemma 5. In systems with loss, there can be solutions that are Pareto-suboptimal.
Proof. Let β = 12 , α ∈ (0, 1), and consider the branching gadget with δx = δy = 32 . To avoid
confusion, let us now assume that es = 3 instead of infinity. We express the recovery rate and
equity vectors in the gadget by (rs, rx, ry, rt) and (qs, qx, qy, qt) for simplicity.
The vectors (1, 0, 1, 1) are (1, 1, 0, 1) are still solutions of this system; these induce equity vectors
of (32 , 0,
1
2 , 1) and (
3
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 1), respectively. Any other solution must satisfy rx =
3
2 · β · (1− ry) and
ry =
3
2 · β · (1− rx). Solving these equations, we get that the third solution is (1, 37 , 37 , 1), resulting
in an equity vector of (97 , 0, 0,
6
7). This third solution is strictly worse than the other two.
5 Finding the ‘best’ solution
In this section, we discuss a wide range of different objectives that the clearing authority could
realistically follow when selecting a solution in the system. Our main result is showing that in all
these cases, the optimal solution is not only hard to find, but also hard to reasonably approximate.
We begin with a brief overview of the gadgets we use in our proofs.
5.1 Tools and gadgets
Branching gadget One of our most basic tools is the branching gadget of Section 4.1. In the
following, we always use clean branching gadgets (with δx = 2, δy = 1) unless specified otherwise.
Recall that this gadget represents a binary choice by ensuring that in each solution, (rx, ry) is either
(0, 1) or (1, 0).
For the analysis, it is a convenient property that the output nodes x and y have a clearing rate
of either 0 or 1 in each solution. Generally, we say that a node v is a binary node if the construction
ensures this property, i.e. that rv ∈ {0, 1} in any solution of the system.
Cutoff gadget Another useful tool is the cutoff gadget introduced in the work of [20]. The gadget
takes an input node v, and transforms it into a binary node w if rv /∈ (η1, η2).
Lemma 6 (from [20]). Given an input node v and arbitrary constants 0 < η1 < η2 < 1, there exists
a gadget with an output node w having the following property:
• if rv ≤ η1, then rw = 0,
• if rv ≥ η2, then rw = 1.
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Figure 3: Notation of our gadgets
1 1
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Figure 4: Logical not gate
Boolean operations The development of some straightforward gadgets enables us to simulate
boolean operations on nodes, and hence represent complex logical or combinatorial relations. Note
that some of these gadgets (specifically, the not gadget, and a nand gate which is used as tool for
our or gadget) have been introduced before in the work of [19,20]. Figure 3 shows the notation of
these logical gates and the cutoff gadgets in our figures.
Lemma 7. Given binary nodes u and v, we can construct the following gadgets:
• a not gate, i.e. a node w such that rw = 1 if rv = 0, and rw = 0 if rv = 1,
• an or gate, i.e. a node w such that rw = 0 if ru = rv = 0, and rw = 1 otherwise,
• an and gate, i.e. a node w such that rw = 1 if ru = rv = 1, and rw = 0 otherwise.
Proof. For negation, consider Figure 4. If rv = 0, then w receives 1 unit of money, and it can pay
its debt entirely. However, if rv = 1, then w has no assets at all, and thus rw = 0.
The or relation is shown in Figure 5; it already uses the previously described not gadget. If ru
or rv is 1, then at least one of the connected not gadgets is in default, and thus w has assets of at
least 1; this already implies rw = 1. Otherwise w has no assets at all, and hence rw = 0.
The and relation is illustrated in Figure 6. If at most one of ru and rv is 1, then w0 receives
a payment in at most one of the two CDSs. Therefore, w0 has at most 1 assets, thus rw0 ≤ 12 .
Since the connected cutoff gadget has η1 = 0.7, we have rw = 0 in this case. On the other hand, if
ru = rv = 1, then rw0 = 1, and rw = 1 follows.
In a very similar fashion, we can also create gadgets that express the and and or relations of
multiple inputs. Note that all of these gadgets only use the input nodes v1 and v2 as reference
entities for CDSs, and thus inserting such gadgets has no effect on the behavior of the input nodes.
Source and sink nodes For a specific node v in our constructions, we often need to add a
debt/CDS going into node v or coming out from v. The aim of these debts is to establish a certain
behavior for v, and thus it is unimportant where this contract comes from or goes to.
For a simpler presentation, we add a specific source node s to our constructions, which is the
source of all such incoming debts/CDSs, and a specific sink node t, which is the recipient of all
such outgoing debts/CDSs. The source node s has es = ∞, so these incoming debts are always
paid (depending on the reference entity, of course, in case of a CDS).
5.2 An example problem: maximizing the equity of a node
To demonstrate the ideas behind our constructions, we first discuss the problem of maximizing the
equity of a given node. That is, given a node v, we define the value of each solution r as the equity
qv, and we denote the search problem of finding the highest-value solution by MaxEquity(v).
Note that this is a very natural problem when analyzing the solution space. If a bank has any
influence over the clearing authority, or if it simply wants to analyze its situation in the system,
9
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finding the best possible outcome for the bank is crucial. However, we show that even for a single
bank, it is already hard to compute, or even approximate the best outcome among the possible
solutions of the system.
Theorem 8. The problem MaxEquity(v) is NP-hard to approximate to any n1/2−ǫ factor.
Proof. We show the claim through a reduction to the MaxIS problem, which is inapproximable to
any N1−ǫ factor [14]. Assume that we are given a graph G on N nodes as an input to MaxIS.
To transform G into a financial system representation, we begin by creating N distinct branching
gadgets. Each gadget corresponds to a specific node z of G: the fact whether the branching gadget
is active or not indicates if z is contained in the given independent set.
Besides the branching gadgets, we add a further node v with ev = 0. For each node z of G (i.e.
each branching gadget), we add a CDS of value 1 from the source s to v, in reference to node y of
the branching gadget of z. If the branching gadget is active in a solution, then this y is in complete
default, and thus s pays 1 unit to v. This way, the total assets of v is exactly the number of active
branching gadgets in the system, i.e. the size of the selected node set in G in our solution.
It remains to ensure that the chosen set of nodes is independent. For each edge (z1, z2) in G,
we consider the branching gadgets of z1 and z2, and insert an and gate on the nodes x of these
branching gadgets as inputs, as shown in Figure 7. We negate the output of this and gate in an
indicator node wz1,z2 . We then take the nodes wz1,z2 for all edges (z1, z2), and combine them with
a multi-input and gate in a final node vc which indicates the correctness of the solution (i.e. if our
set is independent). Finally, we add an outgoing CDS of weight ∞ from v in reference to vc, as
shown in Figure 8.
If the branching gadgets of z1 and z2 are both active in a solution, then wz1,z2 is in complete
default, and thus vc is also in complete default. As a result, v has an infinitely large debt to the
sink, and thus qv = 0. Hence in any reasonable solution, no two neighboring nodes can have active
branching gadgets. If we get a solution that violates this constraint, we can simply replace it by a
solution where exactly one branching gadget is active, and thus qv = 1.
Note that this step of excluding unreasonably weak solutions is a regular practice in such reduc-
tions: if the approximation algorithm of MaxEquity(v) returns an unreasonably bad solution, we
can replace this by a trivial better solution for simplicity. Our transformation (from MaxEquity(v)
to MaxIS) keeps the ratio between the given solution and the optimum unchanged, so starting from
a better MaxEquity(v) solution leads to an even larger independent set, showing a stronger claim.
Thus we can simply assume that solutions violating the constraints are never returned.
Since the equity of v is equal to the size of the corresponding independent set in G in any
solution (including the optimum), the reduction follows straightforwardly. Assume we have a
polynomial-time N1−ǫ factor approximation algorithm to MaxEquity(v). Then given any graph
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G, we can simply transform it into the system above, and use the algorithm to obtain a solution
of MaxEquity(v). Since the node sets corresponding to both our solution and the optimum have
the same value in the MaxIS problem, this also provides an N1−ǫ factor approximation of MaxIS.
As the system consists of n = O(N2) nodes, this shows an inapproximability to any n1/2−ǫ
factor in terms of n. That is, an n1/2−ǫ approximation is also guaranteed to fall within a ratio
of O(N1−2ǫ), which is asymptotically smaller than N1−ǫ′ for an appropriate ǫ′ > 0. However, no
N1−ǫ′ factor approximation of MaxIS is possible unless P=NP.
Note that once the state (i.e. activation or non-activation) of each branching gadget is decided,
this already determines the recovery rate of all nodes in this system. Thus the solutions of the
system are exactly the 2N solutions that correspond to the different node sets of G. Therefore, the
source if this computational hardness is not the fact that we cannot even find a single solution, as
described in [20]. Even though the solution space of the system can be completely characterized,
finding (or approximating) the best solution is still NP-hard.
5.3 The dual problem: minimizing equity
We also discuss the problem of finding a solution that minimizes the equity of v, denoted by
MinEquity(v). While its practical relevance is smaller, this problem allows us to illustrate how
the same technique can be used in case of minimization problems.
The main idea of the construction remains very similar, even though the reduction is based on
a different underlying problem. Recall that MinIDS is also NP-hard to approximate to any N1−ǫ
factor [13]. Thus given an input graph G, we can again create a branching gadget for each node z of
G in order to indicate whether z is contained in the selected set. As before, we use an and gate for
each edge (z1, z2) in G to ensure independence. Furthermore, for any node z1 and its neighborhood
NG(z1), we add an or gadget to ensure that at least one of the nodes in z1 ∪NG(z1) is included in
the set, and thus the set is indeed dominating. Our constraint indicator node vc is again obtained
as the and relation of all these nodes, as shown in Figure 9.
We now have a minimization problem, so we need to ensure that if a constraint is violated, then
qv becomes unreasonably large. Instead of adding a CDS from v to t, we now achieve this by adding
a CDS from s to v, again with weight of ∞ and it in reference to the constraint indicator node vc
(see Figure 10). If a solution does not corresponds to an independent dominating set, then this
makes the equity of v infinitely large. Note that there always exists a solution of finite value, since
any maximal independent set in G provides an independent dominating set of size at most N .
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As in the maximization case, v receives 1 unit of money for each active branching gadget, so the
equity of v equals the number of nodes in the chosen independent dominating set.
Corollary 9. The problem MinEquity(v) is NP-hard to approximate to any n1/2−ǫ factor.
Most of our proofs follow the same general idea, reducing a problem to either MaxIS or MinIDS.
In these reductions, the branching gadgets and the logical gates enforcing the constraints require no
changes; there are only two aspects of the reductions that are problem-specific. On the one hand,
in each reduction, we have to ensure that if any of the constraints is violated, then the value of the
solution becomes unreasonably large/small (depending on whether we are minimizing/maximizing).
On the other hand, we need to ensure that the value of any valid solution is proportional to the
number of active branching gadgets, at least asymptotically, and thus approximating our problem
would indeed allow us to approximate MaxIS/MinIDS.
5.4 Global optima for a system
Given a financial system with many solutions, a clearing authority would have to decide which of
these solutions to implement. In practice, there can be many different criteria for selecting among
the solutions. Some of the most natural objective functions for the authority are as follows:
• MinDefault: minimize the number of defaulting nodes, i.e. minimize |{v ∈ B | rv < 1}|
• MaxPrefer: find the solution that is the primary preference of most nodes, i.e. define the
maximal equity of v as qv
(max) = maxr∈S qv(r), and maximize |{v ∈ B | qv(r) = qv(max)}|,
• MinUnpaid: minimize the amount of unpaid liabilities, i.e. minimize ∑v∈B lv − pv,
• MinPropUnpaid: minimize the proportion of unpaid liabilities (compared to the total lia-
bilities present in the system), i.e. minimize (
∑
v∈B lv − pv)/(
∑
v∈B lv).
The optima for these objectives might be realized in very different solutions, and thus these
problems are indeed different. In fact, it is even possible that each optimum is attained in a distinct
solution, and each one is significantly better in its respective metric than all other solutions.
Observation 10. Let h be an arbitrarily large number; for convenience, we assume h = ω(n).
There exists a financial system with exactly four solutions r1, r2, r3 and r4, such that:
• in terms of MinDefault, r1 is an Ω(
√
n) factor better than r2, r3 and r4,
• in terms of MaxPrefer, r2 is an Ω(
√
n) factor better than r1, r3 and r4,
• in terms of MinUnpaid, r3 is an Ω(h) factor better than r1, r2 and r4,
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• in terms of MinPropUnpaid, r4 is an Ω(h) factor better than r1, r2 and r3.
An example graph with this property is discussed in Appendix A.1.
Unfortunately, for each of these objective functions, we show that it is not only NP-hard to find
the best solution in the system, but also to approximate it to any reasonable factor.
Theorem 11. The problem MinDefault is NP-hard to approximate to any n1/4−ǫ factor.
Proof. We use the MinIDS problem construction discussed in Section 5.3: we encode the nodes as
branching gadgets, and through logical gates, we express in an indicator node vc whether a solution
satisfies all constraints.
Furthermore, for each branching gadget (i.e. each node z of G), we add N3 new nodes uz,i (with
i ∈ {1, ..., N3}) to the construction. Each such new node has 1 external asset and an outgoing
CDS of weight 2, as shown in Figure 11. These CDSs are in reference to a new node vz, which is
obtained as the and relation of vc and node y in the branching gadget of z. Thus, if either the
branching gadget for z is active (z is in the chosen set) or one of the constraints is violated, the
and relation provides rvz = 0, and thus all the nodes uz,i are in default.
Hence if a solution encodes an independent dominating set of size k, then exactly k ·N3 of the
new nodes are in default, i.e. the number of defaulting new nodes is proportional to k. The original
part of the construction only consists of O(N2) nodes, so it is asymptotically irrelevant. Thus if a
MinDefault algorithm always finds a γ-approximate solution for any N , then this is only possible
if it always finds the representation of an independent dominating set that is a γ-approximation of
the MinIDS optimum in G. Hence an N1−ǫ approximation algorithm for MinDefault also yields
an N1−ǫ approximation for MinIDS. Since the system has n = O(N4) nodes, this results in an
inapproximability to any n1/4−ǫ factor.
The task of minimizing the number of defaulting nodes can also be rephrased as maximizing
the number of surviving (non-defaulting) nodes, denoted by MaxSurviving. The two problem
definitions are clearly identical in terms of the optimal solution. However, as a search problem,
MaxSurviving is defined by a different objective function, so the two problems could behave very
differently in terms of approximability.
This is very similar to the case of the independent set and vertex cover problems in graph theory.
Since the complement of an independent set is always a vertex cover, the maximum independent
set and minimum vertex cover are realized in the same optimal solution. However, since the metric
of the objective function is different for the two problems, the approximability of the two problems
is very different: while vertex cover can easily be 2-approximated, it is NP-hard to approximate
MaxIS to any n1−ǫ factor [12, 14]. This is often the case with problems where the value of a
structure and its complement sum up to the total size N of the input.
Interestingly, we show that in our case, both metrics are hard to approximate: we also cannot
find a reasonably good solution in terms of the number of surviving nodes.
Theorem 12. The problem MaxSurviving is NP-hard to approximate to any n1/4−ǫ factor.
Proof. The construction is very similar to that of Theorem 11. Since this is a maximization problem,
we now begin with the MaxIS construction of Section 5.2. Once again, for each branching gadget,
we add N3 new nodes uz,i with euz,i = 1 and an outgoing CDS of weight 2. These CDSs are again
in reference to a node vz, but vz is now obtained as the and relation of vc and node x of the
branching gadget of z (shown in Figure 12). Hence, the nodes uz,i are now in default either if the
branching gadget is not active, or if an independence constraint is violated.
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This means that if a solution represents an independent set of size k, then exactly k · N3 of
the newly added nodes survive. Hence the value of the objective function is again (asymptotically)
proportional to the size of the chosen independent set, and thus an approximation to MaxSurviving
also provides the same factor of approximation for MaxIS.
The same hardness result can be proven for the remaining objective functions in a very similar
fashion. An analysis of these reductions is available in Appendix A.2. Furthermore, similarly to the
case of MaxSurviving, we can also define a corresponding dual problem for each of these objective
functions; these problems are also hard to approximate.
Theorem 13. The problem MaxPrefer (and the problem MinLeastPrefer) is NP-hard to
approximate to any n1/4−ǫ factor.
Theorem 14. The problem MinUnpaid (and the problem MaxPaid) is NP-hard to approximate
to any n1/4−ǫ factor.
Theorem 15. The problem MinPropUnpaid (and the problem MaxPropPaid) is NP-hard to
approximate to any n1/4−ǫ factor.
5.5 Most balanced solution
It is also interesting to consider solutions where the distribution of equity is balanced in some sense.
E.g. if there are two larger alliances of banks (i.e. sets of nodes) that are owned by the same entity,
an authority might be motivated to find a solution that distributes the total equity fairly between
these alliances.
We first consider the special case of finding the solution which is the most balanced for two
specific nodes. Given nodes v1 and v2, the search problem MinDiffEq(v1, v2) is to find the solution
where |qv1 − qv2 | is minimal.
Theorem 16. The problem MinDiffEq(v1, v2) is NP-hard to approximate to any n
1/2−ǫ factor.
Proof. Consider our reduction scheme to MinIDS. We add two specific nodes v1 and v2, both
starting with 2N assets. For each branching gadget, we add a CDS of value 1 from v1 to v2, with
reference to y; thus for each active gadget, v1 loses and v2 gains 1 unit of money (see Figure 13). If
a node set of G consists of k nodes, then the corresponding solution to will have a value of exactly
2k. Therefore, any approximation algorithm to MinDiffEq(v1, v2) provides an approximation to
MinIDS. With n = O(N2) in the system, this implies inapproximability to any n1/2−ǫ factor.
If any of the constraints are violated, we create a debt of N from v1 to v2, thus ensuring
|qv1 − qv2 | ≥ 2N . This makes the solution worse than any maximal independent set in G.
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This already shows that the more general problem of balancing the total equity of two sets of
nodes V1 and V2, i.e. minimizing |
∑
v1∈V1 qv1−
∑
v2∈V2 qv2 |, is also computationally hard. Another
interesting special case of the general problem is when each bank belongs to one of the alliances,
i.e. V1 ∪ V2 = B. In Appendix A.3, we show that the problem is still hard in this special case.
5.6 Some decision problems
Finally, we discuss some further decision problems that could be interesting for a clearing authority.
Note that our base constructions can easily be adjusted to the case of decision problems: given a
graph G and an integer k, we can consider the original MaxIS construction, and add an outgoing
debt of weight k from node v. We then insert a cutoff gadget on v with parameters k−1k + ǫ1 and
k−1
k + ǫ2 for some ǫ1, ǫ2 ∈ (0, 1k ). If v has assets of at most k − 1 altogether, then the indicator
node vd of the cutoff gadget has rvd = 0, while if v has at least k assets, then rvd = 1. Hence vd
indicates whether our independent set in G has size at least k.
5.6.1 Most representative solution
It could also be reasonable for the authority to look at the entire solution space S, and select a
solution that is somehow representative of this space. Assume that we have some distance metric
between two vectors, e.g. let us define the distance of r and r′ as d(r, r′) =
∑
v∈B |rv − r′v|.
There are many natural ways to define a measure of centrality in the solution space; we only
discuss two simple methods. One option is to consider the average of all solutions, i.e. r¯ =
1
|S|
∑
r∈S rv, and define the centrality of r as cent1(r) = d(r, r¯). Another option is to measure the
total distance from all other solutions, i.e. cent2(r) =
∑
r′∈R d(r, r
′). However, given two solutions,
we show that is it even hard to decide which of the two is better.
Theorem 17. Given r and r′, it is NP-hard to decide if centi(r) ≥ centi(r′) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof sketch (with details discussed in Appendix A.4). We take the decision version of the MaxIS
construction outlined above, and add two more large sets of nodes to our system, as sketched in
Figure 14. The generating group consists of N2 independent branching gadgets, with a common
source node sg. The control group consists of N
3 single nodes, each having a liability of 1 and an
incoming debt of 1 from another common node sc. Both sg and sc have 0 external assets, but there
is a CDS of weight ∞ from s to both sg and sc, in reference to the negation of vd.
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If G has no independent set of size k, then in all solutions, sg and sc (and thus also all nodes
in both new groups) are in complete default. On the other hand, if there is an independent set
of size at least k, then both sg and sc have infinite assets in this solution. This means that the
branching gadgets in the generating group behave as regular branching gadgets, introducing 2N
2
distinct solutions, and all nodes in the control group have a recovery rate of 1.
Since asymptotically, the control group contains almost all of the nodes, the two cases are very
different in terms of solution space. In the first case, the solutions correspond to the 2N different
node sets of G, and control nodes are always in complete default. However, if the system has at
least one independent set of size k, then this part of the solution space becomes asymptotically
irrelevant, since there are at least 2N
2
solutions where all control nodes survive. If we define two
artificial solutions r and r′ that have a recovery rate of 0 and 1 for the control nodes, respectively,
then centi(r) < centi(r
′) for either i ∈ {1, 2} if no independent set of size k exists, and centi(r) >
centi(r
′) if there is such an independent set. Thus, deciding centi(r) ≥ centi(r′) implies solving the
independent set problem efficiently.
One could also study further distance functions or the other variants of this problem. However,
our example shows that the solution space can exhibit a threshold behavior between two drastically
different shapes, and it is already NP-hard to decide which of two shapes is in fact obtained. This
suggests that finding a most representative solution is also hard in any other reasonable formulation
of the problem.
5.6.2 Strictly better solutions
Recall that in case of systems with loss, there can also be solutions that are Pareto-suboptimal.
In this case, it is also useful to know if a specific solution can be further improved. That is, if
there is a solution r′ that is strictly better then another solution r, then the clearing authority
would probably want to implement r′ instead of r. If such a strictly better solution r′ was easy
to find, then the authority could iteratively improve an initial solution by moving to better and
better solutions, until it eventually finds one which is Pareto-optimal. However, deciding if there
is a strictly better solution is also NP-hard.
Theorem 18. Given a solution r, it is NP-hard to decide if r is Pareto-suboptimal.
Proof sketch (with details discussed in Appendix A.5). The construction, sketched in Figure 15, is
built around a binary node v0. We take our MaxIS decision construction, and to each node v of
this construction, we add a so-called unhappy penalty gadget. This essentially means that if rv0 = 0,
then through a CDS, v pays a large penalty to a special sink t0. However, t0 has further gadgets
attached to ensure that t0 is still worse off if rv0 is in default, even though it gets money from
this penalty. Thus, the default of v0 is not favorable to any node in the system. Note that such a
situation is only possible in systems with loss.
The base idea is to add a further node w to the system, which, on the other hand, receives 1
unit if v0 is in default, and 1 unit if rvd = 1 (i.e., we have an independent set of size k). Let r
be the solution where rv0 = 0 and thus all nodes in the MaxIS construction are in default, but
qw = 1. Any solution strictly better than r must also have qw ≥ 1. If v0 is not in default, this is
only possible if the solution finds an independent set of size at least k, thus ensuring rvd = 1.
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6 Slightly different models
6.1 Financial systems with loss
While our constructions were presented for α = β = 1, our results also hold for any α, β ∈ (0, 1].
Moreover, a different choice of α, β only requires minor modifications to our proofs.
Firstly, note that the choice of α and β only affects the behavior of nodes v that have 0 < rv < 1.
Since the majority of our gadgets work with binary nodes, they require no modification for any
choice of α, β. The cutoff gadget is also available for any α, β ∈ (0, 1) from the work of [20]. In
case of the branching gadget, one can observe that a choice of δx =
1
β and δy = 1 provides a similar
tool of binary choice for any α, β value.
The remaining parts of the reduction require no changes. The nodes that represent the desired
objective function in most of our constructions are either not in default, or in complete default. If
such a node is in default due to violating a problem constraint, then having α < 1 or β < 1 only
further decreases the clearing rate of the node, and thus makes the solution even more suboptimal.
6.2 Bounded edge weights
For simplicity, we often used infinitely large weights in our proof. One can argue that this is not
realistic, and edge weights in practical systems are of roughly the same magnitude. With some
technical steps, we can also adapt our proofs to systems with bounded edge weights, i.e. if the
weight of each contract is within the interval [1, c] for some constant c. This is discussed in detail
in Appendix B.1.
The main ideas behind bounded-weight constructions can be summarized as follows:
• Each CDS of weight ∞ can be first replaced by a CDS of weight Θ(N) only, and then split
it into Θ(N) distinct CDSs of weight 1, from/to Θ(N) distinct source/sink nodes.
• Our gadgets and logical gates already satisfy the edge constraints, with the exception of and
gates on ω(1) inputs. These can be replaced by combinations of not and or gates.
• Using a cutoff gadgets with constant η1, η2 values is not a problem: by scaling up all weights
in the system, we can ensure that the gadget’s edge weights fall into [1, C0]. In Section 5.6,
we also use cutoff gadgets with ηi ∈ (k−1k , 1); these require some modifications.
6.3 Restricted financial systems
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the relations between nodes, the authors of [19, 20]
introduce the colored dependency graph. This graph is essentially a transformation of the financial
system which removes the ternary relations (i.e. CDSs), and instead models the system as a simple
directed graph with edges of two colors. Intuitively, the two colors indicate long and short positions
between the specific nodes. The work of [19] shows that if no directed cycle of the dependency
graph contains a red edge (i.e. a short position), then the system is guaranteed to have a solution;
thus this restricted class of systems might be of particular interest.
We point out that our results also hold in this severely restricted class of financial systems. The
key observation is that short positions in directed cycles are in fact very rare in our constructions;
in particular, this situation only appears within the branching gadget. Hence, if we devise an
alternative branching gadget that avoids such a cycle, then this already ensures that our hardness
results hold in this restricted model. A detailed discussion of the dependency graph, this restricted
model and our alternative branching gadget is available in Appendix B.2.
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Appendices
A More details on the hardness results
A.1 Construction with different optima for different objective functions
In this section, we describe a simple construction that satisfies the properties outlined in Observation
10. The different parts of the construction are illustrated in Figure 16.
Creating a system that has exactly 4 solutions is straightforward: we can use 2 branching gadgets
that together provide 4 combinations of states. We can then use and gates to create four indicator
binary nodes u1, u2, u3, u4 for each of these combinations. In each solution of the system, exactly
one of the four nodes ui has rui = 1.
We then attach four different sets of nodes to the four indicator nodes in order to ensure that
each solution has the desired properties.
For the case of u1, we add a set W1 of Θ(
√
n) distinct nodes to the system, which all have 0
external assets. From each of these nodes, we create a CDS to t with a weight of 1, in reference to
u1. Thus if u1 is chosen, then none of these Θ(
√
n) nodes have any liabilities, and they all survive.
On the other hand, if we choose any other solution, then these CDSs all incur liabilities, and hence
our system has Θ(
√
n) nodes in default. Besides W1, the system will only have O(1) nodes that
can ever go into default, so in the solution where ru1 = 1, the number of defaulting nodes is only
O(1). Thus u1 is indeed a factor of Ω(
√
n) better than any other solution in terms of MinDefault.
To ensure that u2 is the first preference of Θ(n) nodes, we add a set W2 of Θ(n) new nodes to
the system, all with 0 external assets. We then create a CDS from s to each of these nodes with
a weight of 1, in reference to the negation of u2. If u2 is chosen, then these Θ(n) nodes all have
an equity of 1; otherwise, their equity is 0. Since the rest of our system will only contain O(
√
n)
nodes, this shows that selecting u1 is the primary preference of the Θ(n) nodes in W2, while all
other solutions are the primary preference of at most O(
√
n) nodes, and thus u2 is indeed an Ω(
√
n)
factor better in terms of MaxPrefer.
Finally, we analyze the case of u3 and u4 together. For u3, we only create one new node w3 with
ew3 = 0, and add two new CDSs to the system. Both of these CDSs are in reference to u3, going
to the sink t, and have a weight of h2; one of them comes from w3, the other comes from s. For
u4, we add a single node w4 with ew4 = 0 again, and we create two new CDSs going to t. The first
CDS comes from w4, has a weight of h, and is in reference to u4. The second CDS comes from s,
has a weight of h3, and is in reference to the negated version of u4.
This means that if any solution other than u3 is chosen, then we introduce h
2 paid and h2 unpaid
liabilities into the system. Similarly, if u4 is chosen, then h
3 paid liabilities are introduced, but if
u4 is not chosen, then h unpaid liabilities are introduced. In contrast to this, the CDSs based on
u1 and u2 only result in O(n) paid or unpaid liabilities, so since we assume h = ω(n), the total
amount of liabilities is always determined by the CDSs of u3 and u4.
Let us analyze the total amount of paid and unpaid liabilities in all four solutions. If u1 or u2 is
chosen, then the CDSs of u3 ensure that there is a Θ(h
2) amount of both paid and unpaid liabilities
in the system. If u3 is chosen, then the amount of unpaid liabilities is only Θ(h), while the amount
of paid liabilities is O(n). Finally, if u4 is chosen, the amount of unpaid liabilities is Θ(h
2), while
the total amount of paid liabilities is Θ(h3).
This shows that u3 and u4 indeed fulfill our requirements. The total amount of unpaid liabilities
is Θ(h) in u3, and Θ(h
2) in all other solutions, which is indeed a difference of a factor Ω(h) in terms
of MinUnpaid. The rate of unpaid to total liabilities is a constant in u1 and u2, and asymptotically
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Figure 16: Example system where the optima for different objective functions are realized in
different solutions. For simplicity, the different parts of the construction are illustrated separately.
1 in case of u3, but it is only Θ(
1
h) in case of u4. Thus, u4 is indeed a factor of Ω(h) better than
all other solutions in terms of MinPropUnpaid.
We note that this system illustrates all 4 objective functions in one example, creating large gaps
between every pair of solutions. As such, it requires the very large edge weights described above to
allow a straightforward analysis. Therefore, this example does not generalize to the bounded-weight
case in a trivial way.
To show that the optima for any two objective functions can also differ significantly in the
bounded-weight case, it is easier to provide
(4
2
)
separate examples. I.e. for each specific pair of
objective functions, we can define a separate system with exactly two solutions, such that both are
the optimum for one of the two objective functions, and both functions are a Θ(
√
n) factor better
in the optimum than in the other solution. Using the same ideas as in the construction above, one
can indeed construct all of 6 these example systems with bounded edge weights.
A.2 Reductions for the objective functions in Section 5.4
In this section, we discuss how slightly modified variants of the constructions in Theorems 11 and
12 can be used to similarly prove the claims of Theorems 13, 14 and 15. In fact, for the proof of
Theorem 13, we do not even need to modify the original construction.
Proof of Theorem 13. Consider the construction of Theorem 12. Whenever a new node uz,i is in
default, it has quz,i = 0, while it has quz,i = 1 if it survives. Thus, the number of nodes uz,i
preferring a given solution is exactly the number of nodes uz,i surviving in the solution. Recall that
there are only O(N2) other nodes besides the uz,i, so these are still asymptotically irrelevant. Hence
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approximating MaxPrefer is equivalent to approximating MaxSurviving in the construction, so
we can apply the proof of Theorem 12 without any changes.
We could also introduce the dual problem MinLeastPrefer of selecting the solution which
is the last preference of the smallest possible number of nodes, i.e. define qv
(min) = minr∈S qv(r)
and use |{v ∈ B | qv(r) = qv(min)}| as the objection function to minimize. Then MinLeastPrefer
problem can then be reduced to MinDefault in an identical way.
Proof of Theorem 14. Consider the construction of Theorem 11 again. Each activated branching
gadget results in the default of the corresponding N3 new nodes, each of which cause an unpaid
liability of exactly 1. Thus for an independent dominating set of size k, the amount of unpaid debt
is k ·N3 (asymptotically). Hence an approximation for MinUnpaid also provides an approximation
for MinIDS.
Note that any solution has an unpaid liability of at least N3, either because it has at least one
active branching gadget (pushing the corresponding uz,i into default), or because it corresponds to
the empty set and thus violates the domination constraint (pushing all uz,i into default). On the
other hand, the total amount of liabilities in original MinIDS construction (without the nodes uz,i)
is in O(N2), so we can ignore this part of the system again.
Again, we can similarly define MaxPaid as the problem of maximizing
∑
v∈B pv. To obtain a
construction for this problem, we again start with a MaxIS construction, similarly to the case of
MaxSurviving. However, we now obtain vz as the or relation of the node y in the corresponding
branching gadget, and the negation of vc. Thus if a node z is in the chosen set, then the corre-
sponding nodes uz,i all pay 1 unit of money to the sink due to the CDS. However, if any problem
constraint is violated, then none of the CDSs are present, and thus none of the new nodes pay any
debt at all. With this, the amount of debt paid is again proportional to the number of nodes in
the independent set.
Finally, we consider the problem of minimizing the proportion of unpaid liabilities, or the dual
problem of maximizing the proportion of paid liabilities.
Proof of Theorem 15. Consider the base MinIDS construction, and let us add to this construction
the new nodes of both Theorem 11 and Theorem 12 with a slight modification. That is, for every
branching gadget, we add two new nodes vz and v
′
z, where vz expresses the or relation of the
neagtion of vc and the activation of the branching gadget, while v
′
z expresses the or relation of the
negation of vc and the non-activation of the branching gadget. We then add two new sets of N
3
nodes uz,i and u
′
z,i, each with a CDS of weight 2 to the sink as before. The CDSs from nodes uz,i
are with reference to vz, while the CDSs from u
′
z,i are with reference to v
′
z. While the nodes u
′
z,i
each have 1 external asset as before, the nodes uz,i have 2 external assets each. I.e. if a specific
CDS becomes a liability, then a node uz,i has enough assets to pay for it, but a node u
′
z,i is sent
into default.
This means that regardless of whether the branching gadget of z is active or not, exactly N3
of the corresponding CDSs turn into actual liabilities (assuming that the constraints are satisfied):
either those from the nodes uz,i or those from u
′
z,i. Hence in every valid solution, the total amount
of liabilities is 2 · N · N3 (plus a negligible O(N2) term). The amount of unpaid liabilities is
again k · N3, with k denoting the size of the independent dominating set. Thus the proportion
of unpaid liabilities in any solution is essentially k2·N , which is proportional to k. Approximating
MinPropUnpaid would also imply an approximation for MinIDS in this case.
On the other hand, if a constraint is violated, then none of these CDSs incur liabilities, so none
of the new nodes generate any debt. Instead, we add a distinct set of N4 new penalty nodes for this
case, all with 0 external assets, and an outgoing CDS of weight 1 in reference to vc. This ensures
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that if a constraint is violated, then the system will have N4 unpaid debts (besides a negligible
paid debt of at most O(N2)), and thus the proportion of unpaid debts will be 1 asymptotically.
Compared to this, the case of MaxPropPaid only requires a minimal modification. Since we
have a maximization problem, we need to switch the underlying construction to MaxIS. We again
add two new indicators vz and v
′
z and both sets of nodes uz,i and u
′
z,i for each branching gadget.
However, we now give 0 external assets to the nodes uz,i and 1 external assets to the nodes u
′
z,i,
so that each node z contained in the independent set now generates a paid liability of 1, and the
nodes not contained in the set do not generate any paid liabilities. This way, the total amount
of liabilities is still 2 · N4 in every solution that satisfies the constraints, and the amount of paid
liabilities is k ·N3 for an independent set of size k, resulting in a fraction k2·N of paid liabilities. This
is again proportional to k, so the reduction to MaxIS follows. For the case of constraint violations,
we apply the same method as in case of MinPropUnpaid.
Note that in the constructions of Theorems 11-15, if any of the constraints is violated, then we
get an unreasonably bad solution, and a trivial subset of nodes already provides a better solution
than this. In particular, in case of maximization problems, any one-node subset of G (having N3
of the new nodes surviving) gives a better solution than the one violating the constraints. In case
of minimization problems, any maximal independent set in G has at most N − 1 nodes (unless we
have the trivial case of an empty graph), implying that at least N3 of the new nodes survive; this
also ensures a better solution in each case. Hence these trivial node sets are always better than
any solution that violates the constraints. If an approximation algorithm were to return a solution
violating constraints, we can simply replace it with such a trivial node set.
We also briefly reflect on the fact that we can ignore the lower-order O(N2) terms in the objective
functions throughout the reductions. Recall that in case of the MaxEquity reduction, the value
of a MaxEquity solution and the corresponding MaxIS solution was exactly the same. However,
for the reductions in this chapter, e.g. for MinDefault, they differ in a O(N2) term for both the
optimum and our chosen solution.
However, as discussed, the value of the objective function is in Θ(N3) for any reasonable solution.
This means that for N large enough, we can overestimate the value of a MinDefault solution by
removing the O(N2) term and multiplying the Θ(N3) term by a constant factor (say, 2) instead,
and we can underestimate the optimum cost by simply removing the O(N2) term in it. This way,
the approximation ratio of the MinDefault solution will differ by at most a factor of 2 from the
approximation ratio of the resulting MinIDS solution. Note that such a constant factor has no
effect on our reductions: a c · N1−ǫ approximation (for some constant c) is also not possible for
MinIDS, since this is still asymptotically smaller than N1−ǫ′ with some ǫ′ < ǫ.
A.3 Balanced solution for alliances covering the whole system
We now show that the most balanced partition (minimizing |∑v1∈V1 qv1−∑v2∈V2 qv2 |) is still hard
to approximate if we require V1 ∪ V2 = B. We first consider α = β = 1.
For this, let us begin with the construction presented in the proof of Theorem 16. Consider
the construction modeling the MinIDS problem, and let us denote the total amount of external
assets in this construction by eMinIDS. We assign each node in this construction to alliance V1.
Furthermore, we also assign v1 to V1, and we assign v2 to V2. Since v1 ∈ V1 and v2 ∈ V2, this
will again ensure that any solution which violates a constraint (and thus introduces a penalty of N
from v1 to v2) is unreasonably bad. Furthermore, assuming that each branching gadget has its own
source and sink node, the general source and sink nodes s and t and not connected to any other
node in this specific construction; let us assign s to V1 and t to V2.
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Recall from the proof of Observation 4 that in systems without loss, the total amount of equity
is fixed over all solutions. Since none of the nodes in V1 \{v1} have any outgoing edge to V2 ∪{v1},
the same is true for the subsystem V1 \ {v1}. Hence if for some large integer h, we select es = h
and et = h+ eMinIDS, then regardless of our choices in the MinIDS construction, the total equity
of V1 \ {v1} and t will be the same (as long as the constraints are satisfied). Thus the difference of
equity between the two alliances will be exactly qv2 − qv1 as in our original construction, which is
proportional to the size of the chosen set.
The same analysis is slightly more difficult if α < 1 or β < 1. In this case, we also need to
remove each and gate in the construction, and express the same and condition with a combination
of not and or gates instead. Note that our not and or gates only comprise of binary nodes, and
the behavior of a binary node is the same for any α, β. In particular, this means that funds are
never lost at binary nodes for any α, β value, and thus Observation 4 also holds for subsystems that
comprise only of binary nodes. Hence after the transformation, the sum of the equity in V1 \ {v1}
becomes fixed as before, and we can apply the same reasoning as in the case of lossless systems.
A.4 Most representative solution
We now discuss the proof of Theorem 17 in more detail. For simplicity, we assume k ≥ 2 (otherwise,
the independent set decision problem becomes trivial). As mentioned before, the base of this proof
is the decision version of our MaxIS construction, and the addition of two large sets of nodes to it:
the generating group and the control group.
The generating group consists of N2 distinct branching gadgets, with source nodes of these
branching gadgets replaced by a common new node sg. On the other hand, the control group
consists of N3 distinct nodes, each having 0 external assets, a simple debt of weight 1 towards t,
and an incoming dept payment of weight 1 from a new common node sc. The nodes sg and sc have
no external assets, but we add a CDS of weight ∞ from the source s to both sg and sc, in reference
to a node vD which is obtained as the negated version of vd.
In any solution that does not correspond to an independent set of size at least k (and thus has
rvd = 0), the nodes sg and sc are both in complete default. In the generating group, this implies
that none of the branching gadgets have any assets, and thus all nodes in these gadgets are in
complete default; assuming rvd = 0, this is the only subsolution of this subsystem. In the control
group, this means that none of the N3 control nodes can pay their debt to the sink, and thus they
are in complete default, too.
However, if there exists an independent set of size at least k, then in the corresponding solution,
both sg and sc have infinitely many assets. Hence each branching gadget in the generating group
indeed offers a binary choice, thus introducing 2N
2
distinct solutions for each independent set of
size at least k in G. In all of these solutions, all nodes in the control group have a recovery rate of
1. This means that if G has no independent set of size at least k, then there are only 2N different
solutions (each corresponding to a node set of G), and control nodes are always in complete default.
On the other hand, if there is at least one independent set of sufficient size, then there are still at
most 2N solutions with control nodes in complete default (corresponding to node sets that are not
independent or have size at most k − 1), but in addition to this, there are at least 2N2 solutions
that are induced by an independent set of size at least k, and in these solutions, the control nodes
all have a recovery rate of 1. In this latter case, the solutions where the control nodes are in default
are asymptotically irrelevant, since their cardinality is much smaller.
It only remains to define two artificial solutions r and r′, such that the recovery rate of control
nodes is 0 and 1 in these solutions, respectively. Let us add an and gate to the MaxIS construction
which checks whether our current solution corresponds to the empty set; i.e. we create an and gate
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on N inputs which are connected to the lower nodes y of each of the N branching gadgets. We
then negate the output of this and gate in a node v∅, and add a further CDS with weight ∞ from
s to sc, with reference to this node v∅, as shown in Figure 17. This makes the empty set solution
artificially special: in case of this solution, sc receives infinite assets through this new CDS, and
thus each control node has a recovery rate of 1. Note that this is only 1 solution of the system,
which is asymptotically irrelevant to both 2N and 2N
2
, so this has no major effect on the solution
space in either case (i.e. regardless of whether the graph has an independent set of size k).
The solution r′ is significantly easier to define: we can just select any arbitrary 1-node inde-
pendent set, i.e. any solution that has exactly one active branching gadget. Since k ≥ 2, this still
ensures rvd = 0, and thus all control nodes are in complete default in any such solution.
This financial system design and choice of r, r′ completes our reduction. Since the vast majority
of nodes in the system are control nodes, both metrics of centrality are defined exclusively by
the control nodes in an asymptotic sense. If there is no independent set of size k, then almost
all solutions have each control node in complete default, and thus r′ is better according to both
definitions of centrality: it has lower total distance from other solutions (since they agree on the
recovery rate of control nodes), and also a lower distance from the average (in which the control
nodes are in ‘almost’ complete default). However, if there is an independent set of size k, then r
is the better vector in terms of centrality, since the majority of solutions (and thus asymptotically
the average) has a recovery rate of 1 for the control nodes.
Hence, by efficiently deciding whether r or r′ is more central, we could also decide if there is an
independent set of size k in G, and thus our hardness result follows.
A.5 Finding a strictly better solution
As discussed before, the construction of Theorem 18 applies the decision version of our MaxIS
construction. Note that this construction still works if we have α 6= 1 or β 6= 1 (see Section 6.1 for
details).
A main ingredient for the proof is the unhappy penalty gadget shown in Figure 18. Assume that
there is a node v in the system, and we want to add an outgoing penalty of some large weight h to
v, conditioned on the default of an indicator binary node v0. If this task was executed by simply
adding a CDS from v to the sink t, then the solutions where v0 is in default would not be strictly
worse for every node in this subsystem, since t would obtain a higher equity due to the received
penalty payment. In contrast to this, the unhappy penalty gadget ensures that the default of v0
does provides a smaller-or-equal equity for each of the nodes.
Consider any parameters α, β < 1, and in terms of α and h, let us define a new parameter
b = h+51−α . The design of the unhappy penalty gadget requires us to add a CDS of weight h towards
a designated ‘semi-sink’ node t0, which has external assets of 1. However, we also add two further
nodes u and t′0 to the gadget. Node u has b + 1 external assets, a simple debt of weight b to t0,
and an outgoing CDS of weight 2 to t′0, also in reference to v0. Finally, t0 has a simple debt of b
towards the sink node t′0 (for a simpler analysis, we assume that t
′
0 is not a general common sink
in the system, but a distinct sink node specifically created for v; this does not affect our hardness
result).
In this subsystem, if v0 is not in default, then u has no liability towards t
′
0, and thus it is not
in default; it pays its debt to t0 and has an equity of 1. Receiving this amount allows t0 to pay
its debt, thus also having an equity of 1. As a result, the sink t′0 receives a sum of b in incoming
payments from t0.
On the other hand, if v0 is in complete default, then u has a total of b+ 2 liabilities, pushing it
into default; thus, it can only use α ·(b+1) from its external assets, paying bb+2 ·α ·(b+1) < α ·(b+1)
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to node t0 and
2
b+2 · α · (b+ 1) < 2 to node t′0. Even together with the sum of (at most) h received
from node v as a penalty, this only gives total assets of less than h + 1 + α · (b + 1) for t0. Note
that our choice of b ensures that h+ 1 + α · (b+ 1) < b: since b > h+21−α , we have
(1− α) · b > h+ 2 > h+ 1 + α,
implying
b > h+ 1 + α+ α · b = h+ 1 + α · (b+ 1).
Thus node t0 also cannot pay its liabilities in this case, and hence it is sent into default. This means
that the sink t′0 receives a payment of strictly less than h+1+α · (b+1) from t0, and together with
the payment of strictly less then 2 received from u, it has a total assets (and equity) of strictly less
than b. This is again ensured by our choice of b: the fact that b > h+41−α implies
(1− α) · b > h+ 4 > h+ 3 + α,
which means that
b > h+ 3 + α+ α · b = h+ 1 + α · (b+ 1) + 2.
Hence, t′0 receives a total payment of strictly less than b from the subsystem in this case.
Therefore, this latter solution is strictly worse for the subsystem: v’s equity is decreased due to
the extra penalty of weight h, the nodes v0, u and t0 have an equity of 0 now, and the equity of t
′
0
is also smaller due to the smaller amount of incoming payments. This completes the description of
the unhappy penalty gadget.
Given the unhappy penalty gadget, we now describe the remaining details of the construction
outlined in Section 5.6.2. To avoid discussing infinite equities, we introduce a separate source node
s0 into this construction with es0 = 2 only, and provide the incoming CDSs for node w from this
node.
As shown in Figure 15, our construction is based on a pair of nodes v0 and v
′
0 with no external
assets and a debt of 1 to each other. Clearly the vectors (0, 0) and (1, 1) are solutions to this
subsystem. In any other solution, both v0 and v
′
0 have to be in default, and thus any such other
solution must satisfy rv0 = β · rv′0 and rv′0 = β · rv0 . For any β < 1 parameter, this only yields the
solution (0, 0) again. Thus v0 is indeed a binary node, and the subsystem acts as a different kind
of branching gadget for the case of systems with loss.
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Our construction for Theorem 18, sketched in Figure 15 of Section 5.6.2, uses the decision version
of the MaxIS construction, and then through unhappy penalty gadgets, it adds an arbitrarily large
penalty to each node in the MaxIS construction with reference to v0. Furthermore, we take the
indicator node vd of the decision problem, and create a negated version vd of it, which also receives
such an infinite penalty gadget with reference to v0. Finally, we have w and s0 in the construction,
with ew = 0 and es0 = 2. We add two distinct CDSs of weight 1 from s0 to w, one of them with
reference to v0, the other with reference to vd.
In our reduction, the parameter solution r is the one where rv0 = rv′0 = 0, thus each node of
the MaxIS construction is in default (with an equity of 0), and the nodes in the unhappy penalty
gadgets are also not in a favorable state. Node s0 has an equity of 1 in this solution. More
importantly, node w also has an equity of 1, and thus any solution that is strictly better than r
must also have qw ≥ 1. Note that if rv0 = rv′0 = 0 is fixed, then this is the only solution of the
system.
Thus in any other solution, we must have rv0 = rv′0 = 1. However, this implies that w does
not receive any payment through the CDS in reference to v0. Hence a strictly better solution can
only exists if it has rvd = 0 and thus rvd = 1, i.e. if we find an independent set of size at least k
in the corresponding graph. Any such set indeed provides a strictly better solution: the nodes in
the MaxIS construction cannot have an equity less than 0, and the nodes in the unhappy penalty
gadgets have strictly larger equities. Nodes v0, v
′
0 still have an equity of 0, and nodes s0 and w
still have an equity of 1. Thus a strictly better solution than r exists if and only if there is an
independent set of size at least k in G, and thus deciding its existence is indeed NP-hard.
B Detailed discussion of the model variants
B.1 Bounded edge weights
Each construction in our inapproximability proofs can be adapted to the bounded edge weight
model using the main ideas outlined in Section 6.2.
Replacing the ∞ weights in our constructions is rather straightforward. As a first step, we
can replace each of these weights of ∞ by weights of Θ(N), while still ensuring that violating the
given constraint produces a solution with smaller value than that of any solution satisfying the
constraints. Then for each such incoming (or outgoing) CDS of weight Θ(N), we can split the
CDS to Θ(N) distinct CDSs of weight 1, coming from (or going to) Θ(N) separate source (or sink)
nodes. The technique only requires the addition of at most Θ(N) new source/sink nodes, which
has no effect on our results asymptotically.
If edge weights are restricted to constants, another problem arises when we apply and gates on
a non-constant number of nodes, since this requires a cutoff gadget with non-constant parameters.
For each such and gate, we can simply negate all the input nodes, combine them with an or gate,
and then negate the output to obtain the same relation.
However, we cannot entirely avoid cutoff gadgets with non-constant parameters, since they do
not exclusively appear in and gates. When checking if the chosen set has size at least k in the
decision problems (in Section 5.6), the use of a cutoff gadgets with η1, η2 between
k−1
k and 1 is still
necessary. This would produce edge weights of Θ(k) after scaling up the weights.
Hence we also describe an alternative cutoff gadget variant that provides this functionality while
containing only constant edge weights. This gadget is shown in Figure 19. Given our node v that
indicates the size of the chosen set, we add k outgoing debts of 1 towards k distinct sink nodes.
We can then create an indicator node u which has a total of k input CDSs in reference to v (split
between various source nodes), and an output debt of 1. If our chosen set has size at least k, then
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using only constant edge weights.
v is not in default, and thus u is in complete default (ru = 0). However, if the set has size less
than k, then rv ≤ k−1k , and thus u has assets of at least 1k · k = 1. In this case, u is not in default
(ru = 1). Thus, negating u provides a cutoff gadget with η1, η2 ∈ (k−1k , 1), while only using O(k)
edges of constant weight.
Finally, there are some special cases in our constructions where we discuss the constant-weight
transformation separately.
In case of the construction of Theorem 17, the CDSs from s to sg and sc provide assets to Θ(N
2)
and Θ(N3) nodes, respectively, and thus they need to be split to Θ(N2) and Θ(N3) different CDS
of weight 1 (from Θ(N3) distinct source nodes). However, adding Θ(N3) new source nodes to the
graph is not a problem, since these new source nodes have a recovery rate of 1 in every solution,
and thus they do not affect the centrality of any solution.
For the construction in the proof of Theorem 16, we also have to execute a minor modification,
since splitting the penalty CDS of weight N would result in N different CDSs from v1 to v2, all in
reference to the same node vc. Instead, we replace the penalty CDS by adding N distinct CDSs
from N distinct source nodes to v2, all of them with weight 1 and in reference to vc. Similarly, we
add N distinct CDSs from v1 to N distinct sink nodes, all of weight 1 and in reference to vc. The
resulting system provides the same behavior for nodes v1 and v2 as the original system.
The unhappy penalty gadget in the construction of Section 5.6.2 does not require significant
modifications either. As outlined before, we can split the penalty CDSs into distinct CDSs of
constant size, providing a constant parameter h for the unhappy penalty gadget. With h and α
both being constants, the edge weights required by the gadget are also all within a constant range.
We again point out that the construction in Appendix A.1 does not generalize to the constant-
weight case in a straightforward way. Instead, showing that the objective functions can have very
different optima is simpler on separate examples for each pair of functions.
B.2 Without red-containing cycles
We now discuss the details of adapting our constructions to the restricted case when financial
systems are not allowed to have so-called red-containing cycles.
The colored dependency graph was developed by [19,20] to gain a deeper understanding of the
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Figure 20: Illustration of the transformation into the dependency graph, in line with [19]. Green
arrows (with filled arrowheads) express long positions, while red arrows (with empty arrowheads)
express short positions.
behavior of the system. The dependency graph is a directed graph with edges of two colors: green
and red. Intuitively, a green edge from u to v means a long position, i.e. that it is better for v if u
has a larger recovery rate. On the other hand, a red edge from u to v means a short position, i.e.
that a smaller recovery rate at u is more beneficial to v. We now outline the formal definition for
the colored dependency graph; for more details on this, we refer the reader to [19].
The dependency graph has the same node set as the original financial system. The edges of the
dependency graph are then formed according to the following rules:
• If there is a debt or CDS from u to v in the system, then we draw a green edge from u to v.
• If there is a CDS from u with reference to w in the system, then we draw a green edge from
w to u.
• If there is a CDS from u to v of weight δ0 with reference to w, and w does not have a debt
of weight at least δ0 to v in the system, then we draw a red edge from w to v.
An illustration of these rules, originally from [19], is visible in Figure 20. The rule set provides a
simple directed graph with two-colored edges.
Based on the dependency graph, the work of [19] discusses three restricted classes of financial
systems that always guarantee the existence of a solution. In the most restricted variant, the
dependency graph is required to be acyclic; such a system is guaranteed to have a unique solution
[19]. In the second variant, red edges can only go to so-called leaf nodes that have no outgoing
edges; such systems always have a solution that is optimal for all non-leaf nodes, and this solution
can easily be found by iterating an update function [19]. Therefore, the study of the solution space
in these models is not particularly interesting to us, since it is trivialized by the heavy restrictions.
However, the third variant only requires that no directed cycle in the dependency graph contains
a red edge. This model already ensures the existence of a solution [19], while still allowing reasonably
rich behavior. We show that our hardness results already apply in this restricted model.
For the general intuition behind this restricted model, consider the strongly connected compo-
nents of the dependency graph. Within each such component, we only have green edges, which
ensures that if the recovery rate outside this component is fixed, then there exists a maximal solution
within this component. Given arbitrary topological ordering of the components, every component
is only affected by the preceding components in the ordering. Therefore, we can iterate through
the components in this order, and always select the maximal solution in the current component,
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Figure 21: Modified branching gadget for restricted financial systems
considering the chosen recovery rates of the preceding components to be already fixed.
However, while this ensures the existence of a solution, it does not trivialize the problem of
selecting the best solution according to a specific objective function. This method only provides
the solution which contains the maximal subsolution in the first component. However, selecting a
different (non-maximal) subsolution in the first component can allow us to end up with a different
subsolution in the second component, which may be much more optimal in terms of the objective
function if the second component is larger or more influential in some other way.
To adapt our constructions to the case of systems without red-containing cycles, the key obser-
vation is that in fact, directed cycles are very rare in the dependency graphs of our constructions.
We mostly use logical gates and cutoff gadgets that follow a clear logical ordering, a formula that
we are expressing, thus the dependency graphs of our constructions are already very close to DAGs.
The only exceptions to this are branching gadgets, where x and y both have a CDS with reference
to each other, and hence there is a red edge between them in both directions. Indeed, in any
branching gadget, x and y clearly have a short position on each other. Therefore, the dependency
graph has a cycle of red edges (from x to y to x) at each of our branching gadgets.
Thus we only need to devise a new branching gadget that executes the same functionality (i.e.
represents a binary choice) without a red-containing cycle, and then our reductions already carry
over to this restricted model. Our modified branching gadget is shown in Figure 21. The gadget is
based on two nodes v0 and v
′
0, which both have 0 external assets, a debt of 1 to each other, and are
not affected by anything else besides this (they have no further incoming/outgoing debts and no
external assets). The solutions of this subsystem are exactly the clearing vectors with rv0 = rv′0 = ρ
for some ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The key idea behind our approach is to ensure that in any reasonable solution,
this subsystem obtains either a very small or a very large ρ value; then the value of ρ being small
or large indicates the binary choice (e.g. containment in an independent set) which was previously
represented by our branching gadgets.
We ensure that in every reasonable solution, we have either ρ ≤ 13 or ρ ≥ 23 in this branching
gadget. To achieve this, we append two cutoff gadgets to v0, one with parameters η1 =
1
6 and
η2 =
1
3 , and the other with η1 =
2
3 and η2 =
5
6 . Let the output nodes of these cutoff gadgets
be denoted by w1 and w2, respectively. We then encode the condition w1 and (not w2) through
logical gates, and if this condition holds, we introduce an infinitely large penalty to our objective
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function in the construction (similarly to our previous constraints). This already ensures that we
cannot have ρ ∈ [13 , 23 ] in any reasonable solution.
Finally, we add two further cutoff gadgets to node v0, with parameters η1 =
1
3 , η2 =
1
2 and
parameters η1 =
1
2 , η2 =
2
3 . If we denote the output of the first gadget by x, and the negation
of the output of the second gadget by y, then we can use x and y to represent a binary choice in
an identical way to our original branching gadget. The two cutoff gadgets ensure that if ρ ≤ 13 ,
then rx = 1 and ry = 0, and if ρ ≥ 23 , then rx = 0 and ry = 1. Since our large penalty excludes
any ρ ∈ (13 , 23), this ensures that in any reasonable solution, we have either rx = 0 and ry = 1 or
rx = 1 and ry = 0. Thus by replacing each original branching gadget with this tool, we can use our
original constructions to show the same results in this restricted model.
Note that when ρ ∈ (16 , 13) or ρ ∈ (23 , 56), then the cutoff gadgets do not ensure that w1 and w2
are binary nodes, and thus in contrast to our previous constructions, the and gate might also not
provide a binary node. This means that in case of this alternative branching gadget, some fraction
of the penalty might already apply when ρ ∈ (16 , 13) or ρ ∈ (23 , 56 ). However, any such solution can
be improved by selecting ρ ≤ 16 or ρ ≥ 56 instead, respectively. Thus, reasonable solutions will
in fact always have ρ /∈ (16 , 56). Nonetheless, the binary properties of nodes x and y are already
guaranteed when ρ /∈ [13 , 23 ].
Also note that this alternative branching gadget becomes significantly simpler for the case of
β < 1. In this case, the only valid solutions to the subsystem consisting of v0 and v
′
0 are (0, 0)
and (1, 1). Thus v0 itself can already represent the binary choice, and attaching the cutoff gadgets
becomes unnecessary.
C Further discussion of the model
Finally, we discuss some further properties of the model of Schuldenzucker et. al., and how this
relates to our results.
When defining the model, the work of Schuldenzucker et. al. also applies two so-called sanity
assumptions to exclude degenerate financial systems. We explicitly mentioned the first such as-
sumption in our model description section (namely, the fact that no node enters into a contract
with itself or in reference to itself). However, we have omitted the second assumption for the sake
of simplicity. Since CDSs are usually understood as an insurance policy on debt, this second as-
sumption requires that if any CDSs are made in reference to a node w, then w must have at least
one outgoing simple debt contract of positive weight. The work of [19] uses this assumption in the
fixed-point theorem proof to show that every lossless financial system has at least one solution. We
did not mention this assumption because it is irrelevant for our results; more specifically, each of
our constructions satisfy the assumption, a thus this extra restriction does not affect the validity
of our results.
Furthermore, we also note that the work of Schuldenzucker et. al. shows that even if all contracts
in a financial system have rational (or integer) weights, the system can still have solutions where
the recovery rates are irrational [19]. In this case, even finding a representation of a solution is
problematic. This is also the reason why we expressed Theorem 18 in terms of NP-hardness, and not
NP-completeness: the containment in NP is not straightforward, since the strictly better solution
might not be a trivial witness of this property due to these representation issues. However, we
point out that this is not the source of the computational hardness in our results: in each of our
constructions, every solution consists of rational recovery rates, and even integers (i.e. 0 or 1) in
most cases.
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